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ABSTRACT 
The doctrine of implied federally reserved water rights, as established over 
a century ago by Winters v. United States,1 is critical to realizing federal land 
management goals. Recently, the doctrine’s ability to protect those goals, par-
ticularly with respect to federal lands set aside for non-Indian purposes, has  
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 1. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
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been greatly limited by several poorly reasoned and result-oriented state court 
decisions. The primary factors that have led to the erosion of the Winters
doctrine’s utility are: (i) the McCarran Amendment,2 which allows states to 
force the federal government to assert its reserved water rights claims in state 
court general stream adjudications; (ii) state hostility to the assertion of Win-
ters claims for political and economic reasons; (iii) state court expansion of the 
US Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretation of reserved water rights in Unit-
ed States v. New Mexico;3 and (iv) state court abuse of the inconsistent and 
often ambiguous language included in executive and congressional public land 
reservations.
The arid western states are unlikely to become more amenable to the as-
sertion of federally reserved water rights, and the US Supreme Court is almost 
as unlikely to issue a more enlightening exposition of the Winters doctrine
anytime soon. It is fair to surmise that the problem can only be fully and, due 
to its political nature, appropriately resolved by Congress. Ideally, Congress 
would repeal the McCarran Amendment to undo some of the damage done 
and to prevent the future derogation of this important aspect of federal land 
management law. This, too, may be unlikely given the current political climate, 
which tends to prioritize states’ rights over federal interests and also tends to 
be antagonistic to environmental concerns. An alternative congressional fix 
would be to amend the organic acts or the enabling statutes governing the es-
tablishment and management of federal lands. Should Congress fail to re-
spond to the problem, federal agencies might be more proactive in litigating 
their reserved water rights in federal court in order to ensure the integrity of 
water bodies and water-dependent resources.
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress has well-established authority to reserve water necessary for fed-
eral lands pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the Property Clause.4 Since 
1908, the US Supreme Court has held that when the federal government sets 
aside land from the public domain without specifically reserving the requisite 
water, the government has implicitly exercised its constitutional power to re-
serve water sufficient to accomplish the purposes of that reservation.5 This 
particular exercise of the federal government’s constitutional power over water 
has become known as the doctrine of implied federally reserved water rights 
or, more commonly, the “Winters doctrine.”6
Despite the Supreme Court’s long-standing recognition of the Winters
doctrine, western states, fearing the doctrine’s potential effect on water rights 
acquired under state law, have met the federal government’s exercise of its 
 
 2. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012). 
 3. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). 
 4. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). 
 5. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577-78. 
 6. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 573 (1983) (referring to 
the doctrine of federally reserved water rights as the “Winters doctrine”). 
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constitutionally-granted power with vehement resistance.7 The states’ resistance 
has led to several poorly reasoned, result-oriented state court decisions that 
have greatly reduced the doctrine’s utility.8 This development is especially dis-
concerting because the Winters doctrine was created to ensure that the pur-
poses of federal land withdrawals would not be defeated.9 For example, the 
early doctrine recognized water rights for an Indian reservation where the In-
dian tribe would have otherwise had none under state law,10 and, in another 
instance, the doctrine prevented the likely extinction of the desert pupfish by 
preserving the water levels in Devil’s Hole National Monument.11 In sharp 
contrast to those early successes, several state court holdings have since failed 
to acknowledge the existence of non-Indian federally reserved water rights, 
even in the most compelling situations.12 These derogations of the Winters
doctrine inhibit the federal agencies’ ability to effectuate fundamental land 
management goals, many of which depend upon adequate quantity and flow of 
water.13
This Article strives to identify the factors that led to this problem and to 
explore ways it could be resolved or, at least, to discern a means of mitigating 
further damage to the doctrine of implied federally reserved water rights. Part 
II of this Article examines the US Supreme Court’s creation and early exten-
sion of the Winters doctrine. Part III identifies factors that have adversely af-
fected the doctrine’s development and implementation, including (i) the pas-
sage of the McCarran Amendment,14 (ii) state court bias, (iii) the US Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. New Mexico;15 and (iv) inconsistent, and 
often ambiguous, congressional action. Part IV then analyzes the role of these 
factors in several recent state adjudications of non-Indian federally reserved 
water rights. Ultimately, Part V concludes that Congress, as the only govern-
ment branch with the ability to provide a comprehensive solution, should re-
spond. Congress could prevent future state court mistreatment of the federal 
government’s reserved water rights by repealing the McCarran Amendment  
 7. See infra Parts III-IV. 
 8. Id.
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. Arizona, 463 U.S. at 575-76. 
 11. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 133-34, 147 (1976). 
 12. See infra Part IV. Federally reserved water rights claims for Indian reservations have 
generally received better treatment in state courts than those asserted for non-Indian purposes. 
See, e.g., In re Gila River Gen. Stream Adjudication, 35 P.3d 68, 76-77 (Ariz. 2001) (rejecting 
New Mexico’s primary-secondary purpose rule on the basis that non-Indian reservations of land 
are significantly different than Indian reservations). This may be due, in part, to the liberal con-
struction courts give Indian treaties. See Potlatch v. United States (In re SRBA) (Potlatch II), 12 
P.3d 1260, 1264 (Idaho 2000) (citing Winters for the rule that ambiguities in treaties with Native 
Americans are to be interpreted in the tribes’ favor and stating that where there has been no 
bargained-for exchange, as is the case with a treaty, “[t]he opposite inference should apply.”). 
 13. See Michael C. Blumm, Reversing the Winters Doctrine?: Denying Reserved Water 
Rights for Idaho Wilderness and Its Implications, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 173, 173 (2002) (stating 
that the Winters doctrine “is central to achieving federal land management goals in the arid 
West, because without water most federal goals cannot be achieved.”). 
 14. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012). 
 15. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). 
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or, alternatively, it could at least mitigate further damage by amending the var-
ious organic and enabling statutes under which Congress designates federal 
land reservations and directs their management. Absent a congressional re-
sponse, however, federal agencies likely can and should make efforts to cir-
cumvent damage to the Winters rights associated with federal lands by proac-
tively asserting those rights in federal courts.  
II. THE EARLY WINTERS DOCTRINE 
A. ESTABLISHING THE DOCTRINE
In Winters v. United States, the US Supreme Court established the doc-
trine of implied federally reserved water rights.16 In that case, the Court af-
firmed a lower court order enjoining several Milk River appropriators, who 
had acquired water rights under Montana state law, from interfering with that 
river’s flow into the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation downstream.17
In the 1888 treaty creating Fort Belknap, various Indian tribes ceded their 
rights to a larger portion of land in exchange for the United States’ creation of 
a “permanent home and abiding place” for them within Montana.18 Although 
the treaty was silent with respect to water, the Supreme Court looked to the 
surrounding circumstances to discover the intent underlying the treaty.19 The 
Court explained that, prior to the treaty, the “Indians had command of the 
lands and the waters, [and] command of all their beneficial use, whether kept 
for hunting, ‘and grazing roving herds of stock,’ or turned to agriculture and 
the arts of civilization.”20 It found that the treaty lands were arid and “practically 
valueless” without water to irrigate them,21 and asked whether one could be-
lieve the tribes would have agreed to “reduce the area of their occupation and 
give up the waters which made it valuable or adequate?”22 It concluded that the 
tribes would not have assented to such a treaty, and therefore the creation of 
the Fort Belknap reservation had implicitly reserved sufficient water for the 
survival of that reservation and its people.23 The Court emphasized that “[t]he 
power of the government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appro-
priation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be.”24
 
 16. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
 17. Id. at 565, 578. 
 18. Id. at 565-68, 576 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“It was the policy of the govern-
ment, it was the desire of the Indians, to change [their nomadic] habits and to become a pastoral 
and civilized people.”). 
 19. Id.
20. Id. at 576. 
 21. Id.
 22. Id.
 23. Id. at 576-77. 
 24. Id. at 577 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The rectitude of such an assertion can-
not be doubted. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[The] Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the Land . . . .”). 
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Consequently, despite the potential damage to the upstream appropria-
tors’ sizeable investments (and thus the potential frustration of those appropri-
ators’ expectations), the Court rejected the appropriators’ argument that the 
Indian tribes ceded their right to use the Milk River’s water.25
B. EXTENDING THE DOCTRINE
Although the US Supreme Court established the doctrine of implied fed-
erally reserved water rights in Winters, that sparse decision left a number of 
questions open. Central among them was whether the Winters doctrine ap-
plied only to Indian reservations or extended to other federal reservations of 
land as well. The Court did not address this important issue until several dec-
ades later. When it finally did so, the Court’s answer was rendered without 
equivocation.26
In its 1963 decision in Arizona v. California, the Court considered wheth-
er the Winters doctrine applied to federal land withdrawn from the public 
domain for non-Indian purposes.27 The Court found “that the principle under-
lying the reservation of water rights for Indian Reservations was equally appli-
cable to other federal establishments . . . .”28 It held the federal government 
had intended to reserve water from the Colorado River when it created two 
national wildlife refuges, a national recreation area, and the Gila National For-
est.29
Following Arizona v. California, in 1976, the Court issued its first opinion 
that examined non-Indian federally reserved water rights in depth.30 In Cappa-
ert v. United States, the Court considered whether the Presidential proclama-
tion reserving Devil’s Hole as a detached component of Death Valley National 
Monument also reserved sufficient water to sustain a pool situated within the 
Devil’s Hole cavern.31 The Court began its analysis with what is, to date, its best 
explanation of the Winters doctrine: 
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its 
land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Gov-
ernment, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to 
the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing 
the United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which 
vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future ap-
propriators.32
 
 25. Id. at 569-70, 576-78 (state appropriators alleging that they had invested more than 
$100,000 and that “[i]f they [were] deprived of waters ‘their lands [would] be ruined, it [would] 
be necessary to abandon their homes, and they [would] be greatly and irreparably damaged[.]’”). 
 26. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).  
 27. Id. at 600-01. 
 28. Id. (emphasis added). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
 31. Id. at 131-38.
 32. Id. at 138. 
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The Court continued with a description of the doctrine’s constitutional foun-
dation and scope: 
Reservation of water rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, 
[§] 8, which permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Property 
Clause, Art. IV, [§] 3, which permits federal regulation of federal lands. The 
doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encom-
passing water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams.33
As it had in Winters, the Court in Cappaert again adamantly refused to 
complicate the doctrine of federal reserved water rights by weighing the gravity 
of the interests competing for the water at issue.34 In Cappaert, because a find-
ing of federally reserved water rights for the Monument would adversely affect 
a nearby commercial ranch’s groundwater pumping, Nevada argued the Win-
ters doctrine was an equitable one, “calling for a balancing of competing inter-
ests.”35 The Court roundly rejected this argument, stating that “[i]n determining 
whether there is a federally reserved water right implicit in a federal reserva-
tion of public land, the issue is whether the Government intended to reserve 
unappropriated and thus available water,” and that such an “[i]ntent is inferred 
if the previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the pur-
poses for which the reservation was created.”36
After rejecting the balancing test suggested by Nevada, the Court in Cap-
paert looked to whether an intent to reserve water could be inferred from the 
language of the Devil’s Hole reservation and the circumstances surrounding 
the reservation.37 In doing so, the Court observed “[t]he Proclamation dis-
cussed the pool in Devil’s Hole in four of the five preambles and recited that 
the ‘pool . . . should be given special protection.’”38 This led the Court to con-
clude that the 1952 reservation of Devil’s Hole pool constituted a reservation 
of then unappropriated water sufficient to preserve its scientific value, despite 
the impact on other water users, “[because] a pool is a body of water, [there-
fore,] the protection contemplated is meaningful only if the water remains.”39
As is evident from these cases, the doctrine of implied federal reserved 
water rights enjoyed a relative lack of complexity from the time the Court es-
tablished it in the Winters case up until the Court’s first full explanation of the 
doctrine in Cappaert, despite the contentious nature of water allocation in the 
West.40 As a judicially-created rule of construction, the doctrine prevented 
federal lands withdrawn from the public domain for a specific purpose from  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. In Winters, the US Supreme Court found implied federally reserved water rights 
despite the adverse effect those rights would have on heavily-invested state appropriators. See 
supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 35. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138. 
 36. Id. at 138-39. 
 37. See id. at 139-42. 
 38. Id. at 139-40. 
 39. Id. at 140, 147. 
 40. Harold A. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: Federal Reservation of 
Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 BYU L. REV. 639, 674-77 (1975).  
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being denied the water necessary to accomplish that purpose. It did so by ex-
amining the sparse language of the reservation at issue, as well as the statutory 
authority for the reservation, and by giving effect to both the expressed intent 
and what was logically required to accomplish that intent.41 In sum, as evi-
denced by the Supreme Court’s decision in Cappaert, the Winters doctrine 
served as a common-sense judicial interpretation of federal reservations and 
their unique circumstances. However, this would not continue.  
III. FACTORS LEADING TO STATE COURT DEROGATION OF 
THE WINTERS DOCTRINE 
Despite its status as a relatively straightforward and common-sense doc-
trine for the first sixty-eight years of its existence, the years since have not been 
kind to the Winters doctrine. Recent years have witnessed repeated efforts by 
state courts to side-step non-Indian federal reserved water rights.42 Those ef-
forts have led to a patchwork of result-oriented state court decisions of ques-
tionable reasoning, which have impaired the ability of the Winters doctrine to 
effectuate federal land management goals.43 As detailed in this section, this 
impairment has been caused by: (i) the McCarran Amendment, which allows 
states to force the United States to assert its federally reserved water rights 
claims in state court general stream adjudications;44 (ii) state hostility to the as-
sertion of Winters claims for political and economic reasons;45 (iii) state court 
manipulation of the reasoning utilized by the US Supreme Court in its most 
recent substantive decision on non-Indian federal reserved water rights, United
States v. New Mexico;46 and (iv) state court abuse of the inconsistent and often 
ambiguous language included in the various congressional reservations.47
A. THE PASSAGE OF THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT
After Cappaert, a confluence of four factors significantly increased the 
complexity of federally reserved water rights law and facilitated the erosion of 
the doctrine’s usefulness. The first of these factors was the expansion of state 
court jurisdiction with the passage of the McCarran Amendment in 1952.48
 
 41. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 147 (1976) (reasoning that the pool re-
served by the proclamation at issue could only be protected if granted sufficient water to remain 
a pool); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (rejecting the argument that the 
Native Americans of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation had given up water rights necessary to 
the viability of their Reservation by entering into a treaty with the Unite States).
 42. See infra Part IV. 
 43. See infra Parts IV, VI. 
 44. See infra Part III.a 
45. See discussion infra Part III.c. 
 46. See discussion infra Part III.b. 
 47. See discussion infra Part III.d. 
 48. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012). 
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Prior to the McCarran Amendment questions of the existence and scope 
of federal water rights were almost exclusively decided by federal courts.49 In-
deed, Cappaert arose out of litigation in federal court.50 Before the 1950s, fed-
eral sovereign immunity prevented most federal water rights cases from being 
decided by state courts, despite the fact that many states had adopted judicial 
and administrative procedures for determining water rights within their 
boundaries.51 This led Nevada Senator Patrick McCarran and others to attack 
the application of sovereign immunity in the area of water rights.52 They argued 
that federal water rights, which could affect rights obtained under state law, 
should be decided in tandem with state water rights in comprehensive state 
court proceedings.53 Despite the well-founded fears of the Departments of Jus-
tice and Interior,54 their argument gained momentum, and the Amendment 
was passed as a rider to an appropriations bill for the Departments of State, 
Justice, and Commerce, and the Judiciary.55
The passage of the McCarran Amendment effectively reversed the status 
quo, allowing state courts to become the primary adjudicators of federal water 
 
 49. Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court’s New Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and 
the McCarran Amendment: Toward Ending State Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, 18
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 438-39 (1994). 
 50. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 134-38 (1976) (noting that after the state engi-
neer rejected the National Park Service’s protest to the Cappaerts’ petition for a change in their 
water rights during a state administrative proceeding, the United States filed an injunction against 
the Cappaerts under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, which gives federal district courts jurisdiction in cases 
where the United States is a plaintiff), aff’g 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974), aff’g 375 F. Supp. 456 
(D. Nev. 1974). 
 51. Feldman, supra note 49, at 438-39.  
 52. Id. at 439-40. 
 53. Id.
 54. In opposition to the Amendment as it was first proposed in 1949, the US Department 
of Justice argued “that the proposal would subject the United States to ‘a piecemeal adjudication 
of water rights, in turn resulting in a multiplicity of actions.’” John Thorson, State Watershed 
Adjudications: Approaches and Alternatives, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-18 (1996) 
(quoting Letter from P. Ford, Ass’t U.S. Attn’y Gen., to P. McCarran (Feb. 27, 1950)). The US 
Department of the Interior argued that the Amendment should “only extend to water rights 
established under state law by the United States and specifically exclude any water rights held by 
the United States on behalf of Indians.” Id. at 22-18. In subsequent hearings before the Judici-
ary Subcommittee, the Justice Department’s representative argued “the legislation would result 
in prolific litigation and ‘the forward progress of the West, for which we are all fighting, would 
be impeded tremendously.’” Id. at 22-19 (quoting Catherine Anne Berry, The McCarran Water 
Rights Amendment of 1952: Policy Development, Interpretation, and Impact on Cross-Cultural 
Water Conflicts 111-12 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Colorado)); see also 
infra Part III.c.
 55. Feldman, supra note 49, at 440 n.36; see also Thorson, supra note 54, at 22-19 (“Dur-
ing this period, the fate of McCarran's proposed legislation became fatefully intertwined with 
two major California water controversies. Neither of these controversies directly related to the 
purpose of McCarran's bill; but, once a slight linkage was made, McCarran received considera-
ble support for his legislation from the large and powerful California delegation.”). For a discus-
sion of the devious character of appropriations riders, see Sandra Zellmer, Sacrificing Legisla-
tive Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 457 (1997). 
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rights.56 The Amendment allowed States to join the United States as a party “in 
any suit . . . for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system,” 
and waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity for the purpose of 
such adjudications.57 Unfortunately for the continued utility of the Winters
doctrine, in 1971, the US Supreme Court extended the Amendment’s waiver 
of sovereign immunity to federally reserved water rights.58 Allowing states, 
which are often hostile to federal control of water resources, to force the US 
government to litigate its Winters claims before state courts would significantly 
contribute to the derogation of the doctrine of implied federal water rights.59
B. UNITED STATES V. NEW MEXICO
The McCarran Amendment’s implementation led to the US Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. New Mexico,60 the second factor that 
would eventually impair the continued utility of the Winters doctrine. In New 
Mexico, the Court revisited the subject of the Gila National Forest’s federally 
reserved water rights.61 The Court considered what, if any, water the federal 
government had reserved for instream flows and recreational purposes in the 
Rio Mimbres River when it created the Gila National Forest, an area known 
for its scenic vistas, recreational trails, and wildlife.62 Prior to the Court’s con-
sideration of that issue, the Supreme Court of New Mexico, using McCarran 
Amendment-derived jurisdiction, affirmed a lower court’s decision that the 
United States did not reserve water for recreation, aesthetics, wildlife conserva-
tion, or cattle grazing when it set aside the Gila National Forest from other 
public lands.63 It reached this conclusion despite the court-appointed special  
 56. See Blumm, supra note 13, at 176 (noting that the passage of the McCarran Amend-
ment and subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions holding that the Amendment applied to 
federally reserved water rights “made state judges . . . the key decisionmakers concerning the 
existence and scope of federal water rights”). 
 57. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012). 
 58. See United States v. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971) (constru-
ing the McCarran Amendment’s consent to join the United States as a defendant in suits for 
adjudication of rights to use water of a river system as an all-inclusive provision for adjudication 
of water rights, including appropriated rights, riparian rights, and reserved rights); see also Unit-
ed States v. Dist. Ct. Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529-30 (1971) (construing “general adju-
dication” broadly). 
 59. See Blumm, supra note 13, at 176 (observing that state judges “are subject to election 
and therefore quite sensitive to irrigation and other local uses threatened by federal instream 
water rights”).  
 60. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 697-98 (1978) (arising from a state court 
general stream adjudication aimed at allocating water rights on the Rio Mimbres River).  
 61. Id. The Gila National Forest was one of the federal reservations at issue in Arizona v. 
California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). See supra Part II.c. 
 62. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 697-98. The Gila is the sixth largest national forest in the 
country. US DEP’T. AGRIC., LAND AREAS OF THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM 9 (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.fs.fed.us/land/staff/lar/LAR2011/LAR2011_Book_A5. For details about the 
forest, see U.S. Forest Service, Gila National Forest, http://www.fs.usda.gov/main/ 
gila/about-forest (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).  
 63. Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615, 615, 617-18 (N.M. 1977). The 
original suit was filed in 1966 as a private action to enjoin diversions of the Rio Mimbres, a river 
that flows through the Gila National Forest. Id. at 615. The State of New Mexico filed a com-
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master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, which supported the United 
States’ claim to six cubic feet per second of water in the National Forest for 
minimum instream flows and recreational purposes.64
In its analysis of this issue, the US Supreme Court, for the first time in a 
Winters case, distinguished between the primary and secondary purposes of 
federal reservations, and it held that water rights for non-Indian reservations 
could only be reserved by implication for the former.65 Utilizing this novel dis-
tinction, the Court concluded that the primary purposes for which the forest 
had been set aside could be discerned by parsing the language of the Organic 
Administration Act of 1897: “to conserve water flows, and to furnish a contin-
uous supply of timber for the people.”66 Based on that narrow reading of the 
reservation’s purpose, the Court in New Mexico rejected the United States’ 
arguments that the creation of Gila National Forest had reserved water for 
recreation, aesthetics, wildlife, and grazing.67
While it is apparent that the Supreme Court sought to restrict the scope of 
the Winters doctrine in New Mexico,68 the manner in which it did so was deep-
ly flawed. The problematic reasoning in New Mexico would later serve as a 
guide to state courts seeking to side-step federally reserved water rights.69 Three 
significant defects in the Supreme Court’s analysis are detailed below. 
1. The Assertion That Congress Has “Invariably Deferred” to State Water 
Law
The first, and arguably most fundamental, problem with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in New Mexico was its heavy reliance on Congress’s so-called 
deference to state water law.70 Early in the opinion, the Court asserted that 
“[w]here Congress has expressly addressed the question of whether federal 
entities must abide by state water law, it has almost invariably deferred to the 
state law,” and then the Court used that purported principle of federalism as 
the justification for its new and more restrictive approach to the Winters doc-
trine.71 For example, the Court prefaced its introduction of the primary versus 
secondary purpose distinction in New Mexico with the above quote, making 
clear that its belief that Congress had “invariably deferred” to state water law 
served as an impetus for introducing that distinction.72 Additionally, later in the  
plaint-in-intervention seeking a general adjudication of water rights in the river and named as 
defendants all parties claiming any interest in and use of the Rio Mimbres. Id. The State’s mo-
tion to intervene was granted, the suit proceeded as a general adjudication, and the United 
States was joined as a defendant pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 666(a). Id.
 64. Id. at 616.
 65. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700-02. 
 66. Id. at 707, n.14 (quoting the language of the Act to show Congress intended the national 
forests to be established for only two purposes). 
 67. Id. at 705, 708-09, 711-12, 718. 
 68. See John D. Leshy, Water Rights for New Federal Land Conservation Programs: A 
Turn-of-the-Century Evaluation, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 271, 276 (2001). 
 69. See infra Part IV. 
 70. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702. 
 71. Id.
 72. See id.; see also infra Part III.b.ii. 
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opinion, the Court used its “invariable deference” reasoning as a basis for in-
terjecting a balancing test into non-Indian water rights application of the Win-
ters doctrine despite the Court’s express rejection of such a test just two years 
earlier in Cappaert.73 In doing so, the Court stated that “the reality” of the as-
sertion of “federal reserved water rights will frequently require a gallon-for-
gallon reduction in the amount of water available for water-needy state and 
private appropriators . . . has not escaped the attention of Congress and must 
be weighed in determining what, if any, water Congress reserved for use in the 
national forests.”74
The Court’s characterization of Congress’ past actions in this area was an 
expansion on a statement it had made in another case involving federal recla-
mation projects.75 In that case, the Court rejected the United States’ argument 
that it could impound as much unappropriated water as it deemed necessary 
for a federal reclamation project without complying with state law.76 However, 
the statute in question—the 1902 Reclamation Act—specifically provides that 
the Secretary of the Interior must follow state law as to the appropriation of 
water and condemnation of water rights.77 For the Court to take this statement 
out of context and extend it to the federal reserved water rights doctrine—a 
creature of federal law through and through—was inappropriate.  
More generally, there has not been “invariable deference” in other water-
related matters.78 In fact, prior to the Court’s blanket assertions in New Mexico
about congressional actions and intent with regard to water law, Congress 
passed the Wilderness Act in 1964 and the Wild and Scenic River Act in 
1968, neither of which deferred to state water law.79 In addition, Congress had 
passed the Clean Water Act of 1972, which significantly expanded federal 
authority over the nation’s water bodies.80 Although the 1977 amendments to  
 73. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705; see Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 
(1976) (rejecting the State of Nevada’s argument that the doctrine of federal reserved water 
rights was an equitable doctrine that called for the weighing of competing interests). 
 74. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705, 713-15. The Court also invoked Congress’ “invariable 
deference” as a justification for its conclusion regarding the limited effect of the Multiple-Use 
Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1960), in identifying the “primary purposes” of the 
forest. Id. It characterized the Winters doctrine as “an exception to Congress’ explicit deference 
to state water law in other areas.” Id.
 75. See Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Au-
thority Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 243 (2006) (“In 
California v. United States, the Court declared that the history of federal-state relations over 
irrigation development in the West ‘is both long and involved, but through it runs the consistent 
thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress.”) (quoting Cali-
fornia v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978)) [hereinafter Benson, Deflating the Myth].
 76. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 647, 672, 674-75 (1978).  
 77. Reclamation Act of 1902 § 8, 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (2012).  
 78. See Benson, Deflating the Myth, supra note 75, at 249 (calling the conventional wisdom 
that Congress consistently defers to state authority over water “a myth” and stating “Congress 
and the Supreme Court have generally refused to cede control over water to the states if there 
was a potential conflict with an important national interest”). 
 79. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 936 (4th ed. 2006) 
(noting the language found in the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6), and the Wild and 
Scenic River Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1284(b)). 
 80. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-54 (2012).  
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the Clean Water Act included a provision stating that the states’ authority “to 
allocate quantities of water . . . shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise 
impaired by this chapter,” the Act’s substantive provisions and broad jurisdic-
tional scope remained intact.81 Tellingly, the Endangered Species Act, another 
enactment from this era, has had tremendous impacts on water management 
and it simply provides that “Federal agencies shall cooperate with State and 
local agencies to resolve water resource issues in concert with conservation of 
endangered species.”82
Given this backdrop, the Court’s assertion was, at best, an overgeneraliza-
tion about congressional action in the water arena.83 It was more likely the 
product of the Court’s own biases and federalism assumptions than that of a 
reasoned analysis.84 Subsequent objective analysis and commentary have re-
vealed a more nuanced picture of federal deference to state water law, the 
truth being that Congress has sometimes deferred to state water law and some-
times has not.85
2. Introduction of the Primary Purpose Rule 
Whatever the merits (or lack of merit) of the Court’s generalization about 
the level of congressional deference in the area of water law, it undoubtedly 
served as the Court’s justification for limiting the application of the Winters
doctrine to the primary purposes of a federal reservation of land.86 This limita-
tion, the primary purpose rule, was the second major flaw in the Court’s rea- 
 81. Id. § 1251(g). Congress adopted the so-called “Wallop” amendment, named for Sena-
tor Malcolm Wallop from Wyoming, in response to a Water Resources Council policy paper 
that argued that reducing water diversions might be necessary to resolve persistent water quality 
problems. Water Resources Council Water Resource Policy Study, 42 Fed. Reg. 36,788, 
36,793 (July 15, 1977). Senator Wallop convinced his colleagues that, in light of the report, it 
was necessary to “reassure the State[s]” that Congress did not intend for the Clean Water Act to 
be “used for the purpose of interfering with State water rights systems.” 123 CONG. REC.
S39,211 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977) (statement of Sen. Malcolm Wallop).  
 82. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (2012); see Reed D. Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in 
Common: Considering the Similarities Between Western Water Law and the Endangered 
Species Act, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, 41-42 (2004). 
 83. See Benson, Deflating the Myth, supra note 75, at 242-66 (questioning the conventional 
wisdom that the federal government had consistently deferred to state water law); George Cam-
eron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, 1 PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L. § 5:36 (2d ed. 2013) (“Justice 
Rehnquist repeatedly emphasized the general contemporary congressional deference to state 
water law—at the expense of some contrary evidence in the Organic Act's legislative history.”) 
(citing Sally K. Fairfax & A. Dan Tarlock, No Water for the Woods: A Critical Analysis 
of United States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 509, 533-36 (1979)).  
 84. Constitutional law scholars note the “New Federalism” became evident in a number of 
Supreme Court opinions during the early 1970s and appeared to be in full swing by 1978, when 
the New Mexico opinion was handed down. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: 
A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 306 (1976) (framing the Court’s reasoning in a 
federal law that extended minimum wage and maximum hours provisions to state and local 
employees as an “invasion of state sovereignty”); Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National 
League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Ser-
vices, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1977). 
 85. See Benson, Deflating the Myth, supra note 75, at 243. 
 86. See supra Part III.b.i. 
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soning. The Court’s effort to limit the doctrine of non-Indian implied federal 
water rights by distinguishing between the primary and secondary purposes of 
federal reservations lacked any basis in precedent.87 Moreover, as the New 
Mexico opinion and subsequent state court cases show, the primary purpose 
distinction resists principled application and invites result-oriented and arbi-
trary judicial line drawing.88
The arbitrariness of the Court’s primary purpose rule is apparent 
throughout the New Mexico opinion. As stated above, in applying this rule, 
the Court concluded that the primary purposes of the Organic Administration 
Act of 189789 (the “Organic Act”) were “to conserve water flows, and to furnish 
a continuous supply of timber for the people,”90 despite the Organic Act’s 
amenability to other, arguably more reasonable, constructions.91 In New Mexi-
co, the Court reached its conclusion through a strained and puzzling parsing of 
the language of the Organic Act.92 The actual language of the Organic Act pro-
vides “[n]o national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect 
the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable con-
ditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber.”93 The 
majority read this provision as “[f]orests would be created only ‘to improve 
and protect the forest within the boundaries,’ or, in other words, ‘for the pur-
pose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continu-
ous supply of timber.’”94
In so reading the language of Organic Act, the majority effectively disre-
garded the congressional intent to “improve and protect” any other aspect of 
the forest “except the usable timber and whatever other flora [that was] neces-
sary to maintain the watershed.”95 After all, what is a “forest” or, for that matter 
a watershed, deprived of its constituent parts? With regard to the majority’s 
finding that the Gila National Forest was not set aside for wildlife purposes, 
Justice Powell argued in dissent: 
One may agree with the Court that Congress did not, by enactment of the 
Organic Administration Act of 1897, intend to authorize the creation of na-
tional forests simply to serve as wildlife preserves. But it does not follow from 
this that Congress did not consider wildlife to be part of the forest it wished  
 87. The distinction between the primary and secondary purposes had no basis in the seven-
ty years of Supreme Court precedent establishing the reserved water rights doctrine. See Cappa-
ert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 582, 584 
(1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 566 (1908). 
 88. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 696 (1978); see infra Part IV. 
 89. Organic Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 473 (2012). The Court examined this because 
it provided the statutory authority for the reservation of Gila National Forest. See New Mexico, 
438 U.S. at 706-07. 
 90. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707 (quoting 30 CONG. REC. 967 (1897) (statement of Rep. 
Thomas McRae)).
 91. See id. at 720 (Powell, J., dissenting).  
 92. Id. at 706-07, 707 n.14 (majority opinion).  
 93. Id. at 706-07 (alteration in original) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1976)).  
 94. Id. at 707 n.14 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 475 
(1976)).
 95. Id. at 721 (Powell, J., dissenting).  
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to “improve and protect” for future generations. It is inconceivable that Con-
gress envisioned the forests it sought to preserve as including only inanimate 
components such as the timber and the flora.96
Further, Justice Powell noted that the idea that a forest included the creatures 
inhabiting it had been around since early English law, and explained that this 
broad conceptualization of a forest has remained affixed in the American 
mind.97 As Justice Powell pointed out, a more natural reading of the Organic 
Act’s language would have identified three, not the majority’s two, primary 
purposes for the establishment of a national forest: “1) improving and protect-
ing the forest, 2) securing favorable conditions of water flows, and 3) furnishing 
a continuous supply of timber.”98 The first of these—improving and protecting 
the forest—was utterly ignored by the majority. By engaging in such a contorted 
reading of the Act, the US Supreme Court seemingly ignored its own admon-
ishment in Cappaert—that the authority for a reservation “must be read in its 
entirety.”99
3. Introduction of the Selective Use of Legislative History and a Balancing 
Test
The third and, perhaps, most confounding flaw in the reasoning of New
Mexico was the Court’s selective use of legislative history100 and its weighing of 
state and federal interests in an effort to support its finding of no federally re-
served water rights for recreational, aesthetic, wildlife, or grazing purposes.101
The use of those justifications had no place in the application of the Winters 
doctrine to non-Indian federally reserved water rights.  
In finding that the primary purposes of Gila National Forest were limited 
to “securing favorable water flows” and “providing a continuous supply of tim-
ber,” the majority made such extensive use of legislative history that a reader of 
the opinion might believe that there were no materials supporting any infer-
ence to the contrary.102 There was, however, legislative history that cut against 
the majority’s conclusions regarding the intent behind the Organic Act.103 As 
Justice Powell pointed out in his dissent, when the Organic Act was originally 
introduced, it stated that national forests were established “to preserve the 
timber and other natural resources, and such natural wonders and curiosities 
and game as may be therein, from injury, waste, fire, spoliation, or other de- 
 96. Id. at 723-24.  
 97. Id. at 721 (citations omitted).  
 98. Id. at 720 (quoting Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615, 617 (N.M. 
1977)).
 99. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976) (emphasis added).  
 100. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 720-24 (Powell, J., dissenting).  
 101. Id. at 705 (“When, as in the case of the Rio Mimbres, a river is fully appropriated, 
federal reserved water rights will frequently require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount 
of water available for water-needy state and private appropriators. This reality has not escaped 
the attention of Congress and must be weighed in determining what, if any, water Congress 
reserved for use in the national forests.”).  
 102. Id. at 706 (majority opinion) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1976)). 
 103. Id. at 720-24 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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struction.”104 Justice Powell found no convincing evidence that Congress, in 
rewording the Organic Act before its passage, intended to abandon this in-
tent.105 Furthermore, prior to New Mexico, none of the Supreme Court cases 
dealing with federally reserved water rights engaged in an extensive examina-
tion of legislative history when deciding whether federal water rights existed, let 
alone a selective examination of the sort engaged in by the Court in New Mex-
ico.106
Finally, as mentioned above, the Court justified its finding of limited pur-
poses for the reservation of the Gila National Forest by weighing the state and 
federal interests in the water at issue. 107 By doing so, the US Supreme Court, in 
effect, overruled part of its holding in Cappaert without acknowledging that it 
was doing so.108 In Cappaert, the Court considered and expressly rejected the 
argument that Winters required an equitable balancing of competing interests, 
and held that the only question relevant to ascertaining the existence of feder-
ally reserved water rights was whether “the Government intended to reserve 
unappropriated and thus available water.”109 The approach adopted by the 
Court in Cappaert, which turned on whether water was necessary to both the 
expressed and the reasonably discernible purposes of a federal land reserva-
tion,110 is a more logical gauge of congressional intent than the approach uti-
lized by the Court in New Mexico, which led it to hypothesize about Congress’ 
opinion on how water should be allocated between public and private users.111
By justifying its holding in such a way, the Court needlessly complicated an 
inquiry that Cappaert had left clear and, as subsequent state court decisions 
show, imprudently left the door open for future abuse.112
C. STATE HOSTILITY TO THE ASSERTION OF FEDERALLY RESERVED
WATER RIGHTS
Western states’ very real hostility towards the assertion of federal water 
rights, born of the supreme nature of federal rights and the states’ desire to 
 
 104. Id. at 722 (quoting 28 CONG. REC. 6410 (1896) (statement of Rep. Thomas McRae)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See generally Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 
U.S. 564 (1908). The reservation at issue in Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), was 
created by executive order, so there would have been no legislative history. Notably, in modern 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the use of legislative history has fallen out of favor. See Wis. 
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that legisla-
tive history is “unreliable . . . as a genuine indicator of congressional intent”); id. (observing, with 
regard to Committee Reports, “We use them when it is convenient, and ignore them when it is 
not.”).
 107. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 722 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 108. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138-39; see also Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overrul-
ing (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing the 
practice of “stealth overruling” and its costs). 
 109. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138-39; see Friedman, supra note 108.  
 110. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 139; see Friedman, supra note 108.  
 111. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 722 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 112. See infra Part IV. 
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protect the integrity of their own prior appropriation systems, 113 was a third 
factor that led to the erosion of the Winters doctrine’s utility. Most western 
states have adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation for allocating the water 
within their boundaries.114 Under the prior appropriation system, future water 
users must divert water for a “beneficial purpose” and receive some sort of 
permission or acknowledgement from the state before they possess a water 
right.115 Further, in times of water shortage, the doctrine of prior appropriation 
holds that the user who is “first in time” is “first in right.”116
It is not difficult to see why western states, which have almost universally 
adopted comprehensive procedures for determining rights under their prior 
appropriation systems,117 do not like federally reserved water rights. First, under 
the Winters doctrine, neither diversion for a state-recognized “beneficial pur-
pose,” nor state approval, are prerequisites to finding a federally reserved 
right.118 A second, and related, reason for the western states’ disdain for Win-
ters rights is that a large number of federally reserved water rights do not divert 
water at all but are “instream” in nature.119 Instream rights—water rights that 
require a certain amount of water to remain in the river—are not typically rec-
ognized by pro-irrigator western states unless they are held by the states them-
selves.120 The third, and most important reason for western state enmity toward 
Winters water rights, is that those rights do not vest on the day they are 
claimed and put to use as is the case of state prior appropriative rights; rather, 
they vest whenever the federal government decides to reserve land for a water-
dependent purpose.121 This aspect of federally reserved water rights is particu-
larly upsetting to western states because quite a few federal land reservations 
were made very early on122 and, as a result, any water rights attached to those 
reservations would have priority over many if not most water rights obtained 
under state law.123 Finally, the fact that federally reserved water rights, unlike 
water rights acquired under state law, cannot be lost through nonuse has exac- 
 113. See Benson, Deflating the Myth, supra note 75, at 242 (“The states, particularly in the 
West, have jealously guarded their water allocation authority against real or imagined federal 
interference . . . .”); A. Dan Tarlock, General Stream Adjudications: A Good Public Invest-
ment?, 133 J. OF CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 52, 57 (2006) (noting that, by the early 
1960s, “state hostility to the idea of federal water rights had become ingrained in the region’s 
political consciousness.”); see infra Part V (state court hostility typically surfaces during general 
stream adjudications).  
 114. Blumm, supra note 13, at 174-75. 
 115. Id.
 116. Id.
 117. See id.
 118. Id.
 119. Id. at 175. 
 120. Id. at 174-75; see Janet Neuman, Sometimes A Great Notion: Oregon’s Instream Flow 
Experiments, 36 ENVTL. L. 1125 (2006) (discussing details on the law of instream flow rights); 
Mary Mead Hammond, Federal Instream Flow Reserved Rights: New Decisions with Big Im-
pacts, 46 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 26 (2000). 
 121. Blumm, supra note 13, at 174-75. 
 122. See, e.g., Winters, 207 U.S. at 577 (finding that the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation 
had a federally reserved water right that vested on the date of that Reservation’s creation in 
1888). 
 123. Blumm, supra note 13, at 174-176. 
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erbated state animosity towards the federal government’s assertion of those 
rights.124
D. INCONSISTENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Inconsistent and ambiguous congressional action is the final factor that has 
played a significant role in the erosion of the utility of the Winters doctrine in 
the context of non-Indian implied reserved federal water rights.125 Congress has 
failed to express its intent clearly with respect to the reservation of water for 
federal purposes both in its specific land reservations126 and in the Organic Acts 
that authorize their management by the various federal land management 
agencies.127
Even though the US Supreme Court’s decision in New Mexico made it 
clear that courts would base their decision about whether Congress intended 
to reserve water rights for particular parcels of land, in part, on a comparison 
of the language of the reservation at issue to other, similar statutory authority,128
Congress has continued to act inconsistently when setting aside federal land.129
It has sometimes made land reservations that are silent on federal water 
rights,130 occasionally made reservations expressly claiming131 or disclaiming 
federal water rights,132 and still other times made reservations disclaiming any 
claim or denial of those important rights.133 And Congress has acted no more  
 124. Id.
 125. See SAX ET AL., supra note 79, at 938 (“Congress has not always in recent years been 
able to fashion agreement on specific language that addresses water (other than a disclaimer) in 
legislating on federal land management issues.”).  
 126. See id. at 936-38 (citing examples where Congress expressly reserved water, expressly 
not reserved water, or has not expressly addressed water rights at all). 
 127. See id. at 932, 936 (comparing provisions addressing the reservation of water in Organic 
Act for the National Wildlife Refuge System, the Wilderness Act, and the Wild and Scenic 
Rivers Act). 
 128. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 709 (1978) (comparing the Organic Administration 
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473 et seq., with the National Park Service Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 
ed.)). 
 129. Sax, supra note 79, at 936-39.  
 130. See id. at 936 fn. 12 (citing Las Cienegas National Conservation Area Act, 114 Stat. 
2563 (2000), Black Rock Desert-High Rock Canyon Emigrant Trails National Conservation 
Area Act, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000), Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains National Monument 
Act, 114 Stat. 1362 (2000), and Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Act, 
114 Stat. 1655 (2000), as examples of congressional silence on federally reserved water rights).  
 131. See id. at 937-38 (citing the Act establishing El Malpais National Monument, El Malpais 
National Conseravation Area, and other reservations, 101 Stat. 1539, 1549 (1987), and the Act 
designating wilderness area within Olympic National Park, Mount Ranier National Park, and 
North Cascades National Park Service Complex, 102 Stat. 3961, 3968 (1988), as examples of 
Congress expressly claiming federally reserved water rights). See also Arizona Desert Wilder-
ness Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-628, 104 Stat. 4469 § 101(g) (Nov. 28, 1990) (codified at 16 
U.S.C. § 460ddd note) (“Congress hereby reserves a quantity of water sufficient to fulfill the 
purposes of this title . . . The Secretary and all other officers of the United States shall take steps 
necessary to protect the rights reserved by paragraph”). 
 132. See Sax, supra note 79, at 938 (citing Hagerman Fossil Beds National Monument, 102 
Stat. 4571, 4576, § 304 (1988), as an example of Congress expressly disclaiming federally re-
served water rights).  
 133. See e.g., Sawtooth National Recreation Area Act, 16 U.S.C. § 460aa-8 (2012). 
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consistently when crafting the Organic Acts that grant management authority 
for the various types of federal land reservations.134 As a result, courts often 
have little congressional guidance when determining whether reserved rights 
exist and, if so, how much water may be necessary for the purposes of the res-
ervation in question. 
IV. POST-UNITED STATES V. NEW MEXICO STATE COURT 
DEROGATIONS OF NON-INDIAN FEDERALLY RESERVED WATER 
RIGHTS 
Following the passage of the McCarran Amendment in 1952,135 many deci-
sions regarding the existence and scope of reserved federal water rights have 
been issued by state courts vulnerable to the influence of state appropriators 
and other competing local interests.136 This has impaired the utility of the Win-
ters doctrine in some states and thereby inhibited the ability of government 
administrators to effectuate federal land management goals.137 These state court 
derogations of the Winters doctrine have been facilitated by the US Supreme 
Court’s poor guidance in New Mexico and the continuing influence of that 
case in state courts,138 as well as Congress’s failure to protect federally reserved 
water rights in a consistent and unambiguous fashion.139 For state courts that 
were already biased in favor of state-sanctioned diversionary uses of water, it 
has proven all too easy to take New Mexico’s cue and avoid finding federally 
reserved water rights.140 In fact, it did not take long for state courts to heed New
Mexico’s direction; in 1982, the Colorado Supreme Court authored a decision 
on reserved water rights that unmistakably bore the watermarks of New Mexi-
co’s influence.141
In United States v. City and County of Denver, the Colorado Supreme 
Court contemplated whether the federal government, by withdrawing various 
lands in western Colorado for specific federal purposes, also reserved water  
 134. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (describing Organic Acts for the National 
Wildlife Refuge System, Wilderness, and Wild and Scenic Rivers).  
 135. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012). 
 136. See Blumm, supra note 13, at 176. 
 137. See Tarlock, supra note 113, at 53 (“[General stream] adjudications, with the help of 
the United States Supreme Court, have succeeded in cabining, or tightly circumscribing, the 
extent of non-Indian federal reserved rights for public lands . . . .”). 
 138. See SAX ET AL., supra note 79, at 925 (stating that New Mexico remains the leading 
modern federal reserved rights case). 
 139. See supra Part III(d). 
 140. See, e.g., United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491 (Colo. 1987); United States v. City & 
Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982); United States v. State, 23 P.3d 117 (Idaho 2001); 
State v. United States (In re SRBA), 12 P.3d 1284 (Idaho 2000); Potlatch Corp. v. United States 
(In re SRBA) (Potlatch II), 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000); United States v. City of Challis (In re
SRBA), 988 P.2d 1199 (Idaho 1999). 
 141. See generally Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (noting that, similar to the New Mexico case, the 
Colorado Supreme Court’s task was to limit and contour the exercise of the federal power over 
water rights in Colorado; the Court explicitly relied on New Mexico when discussing judicial 
recognition of federal reserved water rights and extent of the application of the federal reserved 
water rights doctrine to the national forests, parks, and monuments). 
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for those purposes.142 In light of the US Supreme Court’s guidance in New
Mexico and Cappaert, the Colorado Supreme Court correctly ruled on the 
basic issue, and held that the Winters doctrine was applicable to the federal 
lands at issue.143 However, the Colorado court’s restrictive interpretation of the 
scope and extent of the federally reserved water rights was undoubtedly tainted 
by New Mexico.144 Most notably, the Denver court’s conclusion that Congress’ 
1960 enactment of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act (“MUSYA”)145 did 
not reserve “additional water for the existing national forests with a 1960 prior-
ity date for recreational and wildlife conservation purposes” reflected the New
Mexico opinion’s influence.146 With regard to the United States’ claim that 
MUSYA reserved additional water for national forests for the purposes enu-
merated by that statute, the Colorado court came to the interesting conclusion 
that the US Supreme Court’s opinion in New Mexico completely foreclosed 
such a claim.147 The reasoning behind the Colorado court’s holding on this 
issue is weak.148 It cannot be disputed that the issue before the Colorado court, 
whether the enactment of MUSYA in 1960 reserved water in existing forests 
for additional purposes with a 1960 priority date, was not at issue before the 
US Supreme Court in New Mexico.149 The only MUSYA-related issue decided 
by the Court in New Mexico was whether MUSYA “confirm[ed] that Congress 
always foresaw broad purposes for the national forests and authorized the Sec-
retary of the Interior as early as 1897 to reserve water for recreational, aesthet-
ic, and wildlife-preservation uses.”150 Because of the Court’s express MUSYA 
disclaimer in New Mexico, the Court’s discussion of that issue was dicta and 
not binding.151 
 142. Id. at 5-6 (involving the adjudication of the reservations of approximately 1,500 public 
waterholes, seven national forests, three national monuments, two mineral hot springs, and one 
national park). 
143. Id. at 20. 
 144. See, e.g., id. at 20 (stating that Congress had generally deferred to state law); id. at 27; id.
at 27 n.44 (weighing various interests when deciding whether implied reservation for recreation-
al purposes existed at the Dinosaur National Monument); see SAX ET AL., supra note 79, at 925 
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s reading of the 1891 and 1897 Acts [in New Mexico] ‘is arguably 
wrong because the reservation of water for instream uses is consistent with the original purpose 
of reservations.’” (citing Sally Fairfax & A. Dan Tarlock, No Water for the Woods: A Critical 
Analysis of United States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 509 (1979))). 
 145. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31. 
 146. Denver, 656 P.2d at 24-27. 
 147. Id. (citing New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696). 
 148. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 713-15 n. 21, 22. Interestingly, the Colorado court’s later 
reasoning with regard to the relative priority dates of various water rights for land originally 
reserved as a national forest then re-reserved as a national park might provide a tenable coun-
terargument to some its MUSYA reasoning. See Denver, 656 P.2d at 30-31. 
 149. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 713 n.21 (asserting that the issue decided was not whether 
MUSYA “reserved additional water for use on national forests,” and stating “[e]ven if the 1960 
Act expanded the reserved water rights of the United States, of course, the rights would be 
subordinate to any appropriation of water under state law dating to before 1960”). 
 150. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 151. Id. at 718 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).; see also 20 AM. JUR. 2d Courts § 134 (“For a case 
to be stare decisis on a particular point of law, that issue must have been raised in the action 
decided by the court, and its decision made part of the opinion of the case.”).
33794-dvw_16-2 Sheet No. 33 Side B      08/14/2013   08:54:08
33794-dvw_16-2 Sheet No. 33 Side B      08/14/2013   08:54:08
C M
Y K
	ǣͲʹǤ ǣʹǡʹͲͳ͵ͳʹǣʹʹǣͲͲ ǣͶǡʹͲͳ͵ͳǣʹͳǣͲͲ
280 WATER LAW REVIEW Volume 16
The more pertinent aspect of the Colorado court’s conclusion regarding 
MUSYA was how the court sought to justify it.152 After finding that the New 
Mexico decision foreclosed the reservation of any water for MUSYA purpos-
es, the Colorado court sought to bolster its argument in two ways that reflected 
the US Supreme Court’s reasoning.153 First, the Colorado court relied on legis-
lative history to support its tenuous conclusion that MUSYA was only intend-
ed for the narrow purpose of giving the Forest Service the ability “to broaden 
its forest management practices” beyond logging.154 Second, the Colorado court 
engaged in an impermissible weighing of the competing state and federal inter-
ests.155 The court’s statements in that portion of its opinion are a particularly 
telling example of a state court using New Mexico’s poor reasoning and Con-
gress’ inconsistent legislation to avoid finding federally reserved water rights.156
In Denver, the Colorado court reasoned: 
We are convinced that the “implied-reservation-of-water doctrine” must be 
narrowly construed. Additional federal water rights in Colorado may reduce 
water available to satisfy long-held adjudicated water rights, especially in 
streams which have been fully appropriated.  When Congress passed 
MUSYA, it was aware of the reserved rights doctrine. Congress, however, 
chose not to reserve additional water explicitly. In the face of its silence, we 
must assume that Congress intended the federal government to proceed like 
any other appropriator and to apply for or purchase water rights when there 
was a need for water.157
While the existence of implied federal reserved water rights is a matter of 
federal law, the Colorado court’s decision regarding the application of the 
Winters doctrine to MUSYA is significant. It has, at a minimum, adversely 
affected the application of the doctrine within the jurisdiction of Colorado.158
The Colorado court’s subsequent decision in United States v. Jesse made that 
much clear.159
In Jesse, the Colorado court assessed whether the reservation of San Isa-
bel and Pike National Forests impliedly reserved instream water rights for the  
 152. See Denver, 656 P.2d at 24-27. 
 153. Id. at 25 (quoting New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 713-15). 
 154. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 86-1551, at 3 (1960)). For details on MUSYA’s history and 
broad congressional purposes, see George Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Capsule History of 
Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Law, 3 PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L. § 30:1 (2d ed.) (2013); George 
C. Coggins, Some Direction for Reform of Public Natural Resources Law, 3 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 67 (1988); Marion Clawson, The Concept of Multiple Use Forestry, 8 ENVTL. L. 281 
(1978). 
 155. Denver, 656 P.2d at 25-27; see also id. at 27 n. 44 (repeating this mistake in its analysis 
of whether the establishment of Dinosaur National Monument reserved water for recreational 
boating).
 156. Id. at 25-27. 
 157. Id. at 26 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The Colorado court added, 
“The federal government has the power to act in condemnation proceedings if it wishes to ob-
tain water outside the state appropriation system for additional national forest purposes.” Id.
 158. See United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 496, 502 (Colo. 1987) (relying on the holding 
in Denver).
 159. See id.
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purposes of “secur[ing] favorable conditions of water flows,” and “furnish[ing] 
a continuous supply of timber.”160 In considering this issue, the court addressed 
an argument, advanced by various state appropriators, that the decision in 
Denver foreclosed any claim for federally reserved water rights in the national 
forests.161 In its analysis, the court pointed out that the Denver decision held 
“(1) that the United States does not have reserved instream flow rights to pro-
tect recreational, scenic, or wildlife values in the national forests, and (2) that 
the United States did not claim or prove that instream flow rights were neces-
sary to achieve the national forest purposes of timber and watershed protec-
tion.”162 Because the federal government had not claimed federally reserved 
water rights for national forests based on the Organic Act in Denver, the Jesse
court concluded that “any language suggesting that minimum instream flow 
rights are not to be recognized [for national forests], as a matter of law, is dic-
tum and not binding on us in the present case.”163 Although the Colorado court 
gave the appropriators’ argument relatively short shrift, it only reached this 
decision after citing its own MUSYA decision in Denver approvingly and re-
counting its erroneous characterization of the MUSYA holding in New Mexi-
co.164 It stated: 
The Supreme Court [in New Mexico] also held that the adoption of MUSYA 
neither broadened the water rights impliedly reserved when the national for-
ests were created, nor reserved additional water to achieve the supplemental 
purposes of preserving recreation, range and wildlife values. In [Denver], we 
applied New Mexico to a general adjudication of water rights . . . No appeal 
was taken by party from our decision in [Denver].165
As a result, Jesse made it clear that Colorado state courts will not recognize 
implied federally reserved water rights for national forests under MUSYA.166
While the Colorado court’s decision in Denver may have been one of the 
first state court opinions that utilized New Mexico’s ill-advised revision to the  
 160. Id. at 497 (citing United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707-08 (1978)) (noting 
that these were the only two purposes identified by the US Supreme Court in New Mexico for 
the reservation of national forests). 
 161. Id. at 493, 498 (contending that “recent advances in the science of fluvial geomorpholo-
gy demonstrate that minimum instream water flows are necessary to preserve efficient stream 
channels in the national forests and ‘to secure favorable conditions of water flows,’ one of the 
purposes for which the national forests were created under the Organic Act”). 
 162. Id. at 497 (citing Denver, 656 P.2d at 22-23). 
163. Id. at 503; see also supra Part IV (ironically, the Colorado court’s argument why its 
decision in Denver did not foreclose it from considering the issue in Jesse shows why the former 
opinion’s conclusion that New Mexico was dispositive of the MUSYA federally reserved water 
right claims before it was wrong).  
 164. Jesse, 44 P.2d at 497, 502-03 (citing New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707-08; Denver, 656 P.2d 
at 35). 
 165. Id. at 497 (citing Denver, 656 P.2d at 22-23). 
 166. Id. The federal district courts in Colorado, by contrast, have been more receptive to 
federal reserved water rights claims. See infra notes 241-45, 259 and accompanying text (citing 
High Country Citizens’ Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2006); Sierra Club 
v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985)).
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Winters doctrine to avoid finding federally reserved water rights,167 it was cer-
tainly not the last, nor even the most significant. In 1987, the State of Idaho 
began a massive general stream adjudication of the Snake River Basin.168 The 
Snake River Basin Adjudication (“SRBA”) is still ongoing as of the date of 
publication of this article and involves ninety percent of all the water right 
claims in Idaho, including some 50,000 federal claims.169 The SRBA has re-
sulted in numerous Idaho state court decisions determining the existence (or, 
more frequently, the nonexistence) and extent of the reserved water rights of 
various types of federal public lands.170
In an early SRBA decision, United States v. City of Challis, the Idaho 
court addressed the exact same MUSYA question that the Colorado court had 
in Denver.171 The issue received no better treatment in Idaho than it had in 
Colorado.172 In Challis, the United States argued: 
New Mexico’s language relating to MUSYA is dictum because the Supreme 
Court did not have before it the question of whether MUSYA established a 
federal reserved water right with a priority date of 1960, but rather addressed 
whether MUSYA reached back before its enactment to expand the purposes 
of national forests as of the date of the Organic Act of 1897.173
Although a fair reading of the New Mexico opinion supports the United 
States’ argument,174 the Idaho court rejected it and concluded “the Supreme 
Court’s analysis as to whether MUSYA reserved water for its purposes and 
thus created a federally reserved water right applies to either priority date.”175
Thus, according to the Idaho court, MUSYA was not intended to re-reserve 
water for MUSYA’s expanded list of national forest purposes, regardless of 
reservation or priority date.176 Noticeably, the Idaho court did not cite any au-
thority addressing why the US Supreme Court’s decision on one point of law 
 
 167. Denver, 656 P.2d at 22-23.
 168. Blumm, supra note 13, at 180. 
 169. Id. at 176, 180. 
 170. See generally United States v. State (In re SRBA), 23 P.3d 117 (Idaho 2001); State v. 
United States (In re SRBA), 12 P.3d 1284 (Idaho 2000); Potlatch Corp. v. United States (In re
SRBA) (Potlatch II), 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000); Potlatch Corp. v. United States (In re SRBA) 
(Potlatch I), No. 24546, 1999 WL 778325 (Idaho Oct. 1, 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and 
vacated in part, 12 P.3d 1260; United States v. City of Challis (In re SRBA), 988 P.2d 1199 
(Idaho 1999). 
 171. Compare Challis, 988 P.2d at 1201 (considering whether MUSYA reserved additional 
water in national forests for its purposes with a 1960 priority date), with Denver, 656 P.2d at 24-
27 (considering whether MUSYA reserved additional water in national forests for its purposes 
with a 1960 priority date). 
 172. Compare Challis, 988 P.2d at 1206-07 (holding that MUSYA does not create a federal 
reservation of water as of the date its enactment in 1960), with Denver, 656 P.2d at 27 (holding 
that MUSYA does not reserve additional water for outdoor recreation purposes). 
 173. Challis, 988 P.2d at 1205. 
 174. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text. 
 175. Challis, 988 P.2d at 1205. 
 176. Id.
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would be binding on another, distinct, point of law that the US Supreme Court 
refused to decide.177
The Idaho court also misread MUSYA’s statement that national forests 
“are established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, tim-
ber, watershed and wildlife and fish purposes.”178 The US reasonably posited 
that the statute’s language evidenced an intent to re-reserve national forests for 
additional purposes. The Idaho court disagreed and chided that the statute 
states not only that the national forests “are established” but, also, that they 
“shall be administered” for MUSYA purposes.179 Of course, the same criticism 
could be leveled against the Idaho court’s own parsing of the statutory lan-
guage. Specifically, the court’s conclusion that “the statute as a whole indicates 
that MUSYA was intended only to expand the purposes for which the national 
forests are administered” reads the “are established” language right out of the 
statute.180 Finally, the court stated that, even if it believed MUSYA constituted a 
re-reservation of national forests for additional purposes, the statute was not 
intended to expressly or impliedly reserve water for those purposes.181 Its anal-
ysis on this point hinged almost entirely on the same legislative history that the 
New Mexico majority discussed when considering the MUSYA issue before 
it.182
Despite Idaho’s hostility toward the assertion of federally reserved water 
rights, as was apparent in Challis and later SRBA decisions, another early deci-
sion arising out of the adjudication of the Snake River Basin served for a short 
time as an example of a state court faithfully adhering to the Winters decision
and to sound reason.183 The primary issue in Potlach v. United States (Potlatch
I) was whether federal water rights were impliedly reserved upon the estab-
lishment of three wilderness areas.184 In the majority opinion, the Idaho Su-
preme Court analyzed this question in a straightforward and common sense 
fashion reminiscent of the US Supreme Court’s pre-New Mexico opinions on 
the Winters doctrine. The Idaho court stated that, because the claims in ques-
tion were based on the purposes of the Wilderness Act, its “analysis must 
begin with an examination of the Wilderness Act, the acts establishing the 
Wilderness Areas, and the circumstances and history surrounding their desig-
nation, to determine whether federal reserved water rights exist . . . .”185 The 
Idaho court took heed of the language of the Wilderness Act and noted that  
 177. See id. 
 178. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31). 
 179. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31). 
 180. See id. (emphasis added). 
 181. Id.
 182. Compare Challis, 988 P.2d at 1206 n.4, with New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 713-15 (foot-
notes omitted). 
 183. Potlatch I, No. 24546, 1999 WL 778325 (Idaho Oct. 1, 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part, and vacated in part, 12 P.3d 1260. 
 184. Id. at *2. 
 185. Id. at *3 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136). Cf. Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128, 139-42 (begin-
ning its analysis of whether federally reserved water rights existed with an examination of the 
statutory authority of the reservation and relying primarily on a natural reading of that authority 
to reach its conclusion) (citations omitted). 
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the statute plainly proclaimed that wilderness areas were to be established “[i]n 
order to assure that an increasing population . . . does not occupy or modify 
all areas within the United States and its possessions, leaving no lands desig-
nated for the preservation and protection in their natural condition . . . to se-
cure for the American people . . . the benefits of an enduring resource of wil-
derness.”186
The court also noted the statute defined wilderness “as an area ‘retaining 
its primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or 
human habitations, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natu-
ral conditions.’”187 Based on the Act’s clear statutory language, the Idaho Su-
preme Court sensibly concluded that Congress’s primary purpose in designat-
ing the three wilderness areas at issue was “wilderness preservation.”188 Conse-
quently, because the court believed that human development under Idaho’s 
system of prior appropriation was incompatible with wilderness preservation, 
the court in Potlatch I found the US government had reserved all of the then-
unappropriated water within the wilderness areas upon the date it set them 
aside from the public domain.189
But the soundly reasoned decision in Potlatch I would not stand. To the 
great misfortune of both the doctrine of implied federally reserved water rights 
in Idaho and Idahoans that enjoy their state’s wilderness, the Idaho Supreme 
Court’s decision in Potlach I caused such a public outcry among that state’s 
water appropriators and “states’ righters” that the author of that decision, Jus-
tice Cathy Silak, lost her bid for reelection.190 Following this, the Idaho Su-
preme Court decided to rehear the issues raised in Potlatch I.191 Unsurprising-
ly, the court reversed its Wilderness Act decision upon rehearing the case.192
The Idaho Supreme Court’s second Potlatch opinion (Potlatch II) was, from 
start to finish, result-oriented and constitutes an egregious example of a state 
court embracing New Mexico’s crabbed interpretation of the Winters doc-
trine.193
In Potlatch II, the Idaho Supreme Court again took up the issue of 
whether water rights were reserved when Congress designated the Frank 
Church River of No Return, Gospel-Hump, and Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness 
Areas.194 The new majority began its analysis of this issue by surveying the US 
Supreme Court’s Winters jurisprudence,195 but the analysis ignored the non-
Indian federally reserved water rights holding in Arizona and cited New Mexi-
co in a way that made it look like that decision foreclosed the possibility of any
impliedly reserved rights.196 The Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis of the United  
 186. Potlatch I, 1999 WL 778325, at *4 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a)). 
 187. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)). 
 188. Id. at *4, *8. 
 189. Id. at *8. 
 190. See Blumm, supra note 13, at 186-88. 
 191. Id. at 188. 
 192. Potlatch Corp. v. United States (In re SRBA) (Potlatch II), 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000). 
 193. Id.
 194. Id. at 1262.  
 195. Id. at 1263-64. 
 196. Id. at 1264-66. 
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States’ Wilderness Act claims led the court to conclude that there was nothing 
within that Act compelling the conclusion that the Act’s purposes would be 
defeated without water.197 The court supported this holding by selectively citing 
some of the Wilderness Act’s legislative history,198 pointing to the availability of 
other means of protecting the wilderness areas’ water,199 and weighing state and 
federal interests.200
Fortunately, Justice Silak’s time on the Idaho Supreme Court was not yet 
at an end. Silak wrote an impassioned dissent that rejected the majority opin-
ion’s contorted reasoning on many fronts.201 Silak began by pointing out that 
the majority’s discussion of the Winters doctrine precedent was “misleading.”202
She continued by admonishing the majority for rejecting wilderness area water 
rights simply because other means of protecting those rights may have been 
available: 
I disagree with the majority opinion’s theory which simply stated is: because 
the structure of the Wilderness Act prevents development of the land in wil-
derness areas and, therefore, water will be protected as a natural side-effect of 
the limits on land-development, the federal government does not need a fed-
eral water right. The majority uses this theory as a substitute for implying a 
water right in wilderness areas. Although this is an attractive theory, only the 
United States Supreme Court may articulate new legal theories regarding 
federal law.203
Silak further characterized the majority’s reasoning as “so restrictive that it 
eliminates the ‘implied’ aspect of the Winters doctrine and leaves no room for 
any Act of Congress to ever imply a ‘water’ right.”204 Justice Silak then repeated 
her holding in Potlatch I: based on the express statutory language, the primary 
purpose of Wilderness Act designations was to “set aside certain designated 
areas and preserve their untouched wilderness character.”205 She concluded 
that the majority should have found implied federal reserved water rights for 
the wilderness areas because the areas’ purpose would be entirely defeated 
without water.206
The Idaho Supreme Court’s abuse of the Winters doctrine did not end 
with Potlatch II; nearly all of that court’s subsequent SRBA decisions regard-
 
 197. Id. at 1266-67. 
 198. Id. at 1280 (Silak, J., dissenting).  
 199. Id. at 1266-68 (majority opinion). 
 200. Id.
 201. Id. at 1273-83 (Silak, J., dissenting). 
 202. Id. at 1273. 
 203. Id. at 1273-74. 
 204. Id. at 1276. 
 205. Id. at 1278; Potlatch Corp. v. United States (In re SRBA) (Potlatch I), No. 24546, 1999 
WL 778325, at *4 (Idaho Oct. 1, 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and vacated in part, 12 P.3d 
1260. 
 206. Potlatch Corp. v. United States (In re SRBA) (Potlatch II), 12 P.3d 1260, 1282 (Idaho 
2000). 
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ing federal reserved rights have been similarly flawed.207 In Idaho v. United 
States, another SRBA opinion handed down on the same day as Potlatch II,
the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether Congress, when it established 
the Sawtooth National Recreational Area (“Sawtooth NRA”), impliedly re-
served water to satisfy the purposes of that reservation.208 The Act establishing 
the Sawtooth NRA stated it was created “to assure the preservation and protec-
tion of the natural, scenic, historic, pastoral, and fish and wildlife values and to 
provide for the enhancement of the recreational values associated therewith.”209
The Idaho Supreme Court began its analysis correctly by setting forth the 
bedrock principle that a “[c]ourt need merely apply the statute without engag-
ing in any statutory interpretation” if the language of the Act is “clear and un-
ambiguous,” and by stating “[i]n this case, the primary purpose of the Act is 
clear from the plain language of the statute itself.”210 However, after stating this, 
the court chose to ignore the principle it had just recounted and eschewed any 
reasonable reading of the plain language of the Sawtooth NRA Act.211 Based on 
an extremely strained reading of the statute, the Idaho Supreme Court con-
cluded “a review of the entire legislation reveals the primary purpose of the 
Act was to protect the Sawtooth NRA from the dangers of unrestricted devel-
opment and mining operations.”212 This contorted reading of the Act ultimately 
led the court to hold the Act did not expressly or impliedly reserve water for 
the purposes of the NRA.213
Still serving out her remaining time on the bench, Justice Silak was, yet 
again, the lone dissenter. Justice Silak argued that the majority’s analysis of the 
primary purpose of the Sawtooth NRA Act was unsupportable: 
[W]ithout support in either the Act itself or in the legislative history it confus-
es the means for the end: the “means” of preservation is regulating subdivi-
sions and mining. The “end” is to “assure the preservation and protection of 
the natural, scenic, historic, pastoral and fish and wildlife values and to pro-
vide for the enhancement of the recreational values associated therewith . . . 
.” This is the primary purpose of the Act and it cannot be achieved, under 
the Winters doctrine, without water.214
In her view, the express words of the Act were sufficient to determine the pri-
mary purpose of the reservation and a more objective review of the Act’s legis-
lative history “reaffirm[ed] what Congress expressly stated in the statutory lan-
guage.”215
 
 207. See generally Blumm, supra note 13 (criticizing the Idaho Supreme Court’s SRBA 
decisions pertaining to implied federally reserved water rights). 
 208. State v. United States (In re SRBA), 12 P.3d 1284, 1286 (Idaho 2000). 
 209. Id. at 1286 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 460aa(a)) (emphasis added). 
 210. Id. at 1288.  
 211. See id. at 1288-91. 
 212. Id. at 1289. 
 213. Id. at 1291. 
 214. Id. at 1291 (Silak, J., dissenting). 
 215. Id.
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The Idaho Supreme Court was not yet finished. One year after Potlatch II 
and Idaho v. United States, it decided another SRBA case dealing with non-
Indian implied federally reserved water rights.216 In United States v. Idaho, the 
Idaho court considered whether water was set aside by a series of executive 
and public land orders that reserved approximately ninety-four islands and 
created Deer Flat Migratory Waterfowl Refuge.217 The various orders that 
withdrew the refuge islands from the public domain stated “all islands . . . with-
in the . . . limits of the following described area . . . are hereby withdrawn as a 
refuge and breeding ground for migratory birds and other wildlife” in order to 
further the purposes of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act (“MBCA”).218
Based on this language, the United States argued that the purpose of reserving 
the Deer Flat islands would be frustrated without water because “[i]slands by 
definition must be surrounded by water, and waterfowl and many other migra-
tory birds need riparian habitat and access to open water for feeding, breeding, 
resting, and protection from predators.”219
Despite the soundness of the argument, and despite the US Supreme 
Court’s decision thirty-eight years earlier in Arizona that the United States 
intended to reserve water for Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge and Im-
perial National Wildlife Refuge when they were established “as . . . refuge[s] 
and breeding ground[s] for migratory birds,”220 the Idaho Supreme Court con-
cluded that withdrawal of the Deer Flat islands had not impliedly reserved any 
water.221 It conceded that the islands did indeed require water to remain is-
lands, but refused to recognize its relevance to the question of whether the 
orders at issue also reserved water for the island refuge.222 The court reasoned 
that “[i]t is the purpose of the reservation at issue, not the definition of the 
land reserved.”223
Even though the reservations at issue in Arizona were identical in every 
material respect, the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished the Deer Flat Migra-
tory Refuge reservations from those in Arizona.224 The court made this distinc-
tion because Arizona was decided prior to New Mexico’s introduction of the 
primary purpose rule and because, unlike the reservations in Arizona, the  
 216. United States v. State, 23 P. 3d 117, 120 (Idaho 2001). 
 217. Id.
 218. Id. at 121 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 219. Brief of Appellant United States at 26, United States v. State (In re SRBA), 23 P.3d 117 
(Idaho 2001) (No. 25546), 1999 WL 33913490 at *26.
 220. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (determining that the United States 
intended to reserve water for Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge and Imperial National 
Wildlife Refuge when the Refuges were established “as a refuge and breeding ground for migra-
tory birds”); Exec. Order No. 8,647, 6 Fed. Reg. 593 (Jan. 22, 1941) (establishing Havasu Lake 
National Wildlife Refuge); Exec. Order No. 8,685, 6 Fed. Reg. 1016 (Feb. 14, 1941) (establish-
ing Imperial National Wildlife Refuge). 
 221. United States v. State, 23 P.3d at 126. 
 222. Id. at 125. 
 223. Id. Here, the Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion ignored the fact that the US Supreme 
Court felt differently when it had previously addressed a reservation of federal land that similar-
ly, by definition, included water in Cappaert. See supra Part IV; see also infra Part VI. 
 224. United States v. State, 23 P.3d at 127. 
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Deer Flat reservations were made under the authority of the MBCA.225 Based 
on its narrow reading of the MBCA’s legislative history, the court reasoned 
that the primary purpose for the withdrawal of the Deer Flat islands was not to 
provide migratory waterfowl with a sanctuary in general.226 Rather, the Court 
found that the islands’ reservation was intended only prevent human preda-
tion.227 As Justice Silak would have likely pointed out,228 here, the Idaho Su-
preme Court confused the means of the MBCA—protection from human pre-
dation—with the end (or purpose) of the land reservations—migratory bird con-
servation.229 Nevertheless, because the court’s analysis determined the refuge 
would provide the birds with protection from hunting irrespective of the pres-
ence or absence of water and islands, the court concluded that the federal 
withdrawal of the refuge’s islands did not reserve any water.230
As with the Colorado cases, the derogation of the Winters doctrine at the 
hands of the Idaho Supreme Court in its SRBA cases transcends these indi-
vidual cases. While the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court regarding fed-
erally reserved water rights are just that—state court decisions on federal law 
that are not binding on other state courts or federal courts—they are still inter-
pretations of federal law that lower courts in Idaho are bound to follow (and 
that other state courts may be tempted to look to as persuasive precedent). In 
a span of just two years, the Idaho Supreme Court effectively destroyed the 
ability of the federal government to successfully assert its federally reserved 
water rights in Idaho state courts to meet the needs of national forests reserved 
for MUSYA purposes, national wilderness areas, and, possibly, any other fed-
eral land that is not withdrawn by an instrument that expressly reserves water 
for its purposes.231
V. IMPLEMENTING JUSTICE SILAK’S PLEA AND BEYOND 
Justice Silak’s dissenting opinion in Potlatch II232 is notable not only for its 
faithful adherence to the Winters doctrine, but also for its insight and pru-
dence. Near the end of that opinion, she identified the problem inherent in 
modern state court Winters jurisprudence as well as a solution.233 There, she 
stated: 
 
 225. Id.
 226. See id. at 123-26. 
 227. Id. at 123-24. 
 228. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 229. See Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §715c (2013); United States v. State,
23 P.3d at 123, 126. 
 230. United States v. State, 23 P.3d at 125-29. 
 231. See id.; United States v. City of Challis (In re SRBA), 988 P.2d 1199 (Idaho 1999). In a 
companion case, the Idaho court recognized that the Wild and Scenic River Act, in contrast to 
the other statutes at issue, expressly reserved federal water rights. See Potlatch v. U.S., 134 
Idaho 912, 12 P.3d 1256 (2000) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1284(b)).
 232. Potlatch Corp. v. United States (In re SRBA) (Potlatch II), 12 P.3d 1260, 1273-83 
(Idaho 2000) (Silak, J., dissenting). 
 233. Id. at 1282. 
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In sum, it is not for this Court, nor any court, to make or change the law, but 
to interpret the law as enacted by the legislative branch. Until Congress enacts 
further legislation clarifying the Wilderness Act as to federal reserved water 
rights, or otherwise resolves this issue, courts must apply the Winters doc-
trine to resolve these disputes. In applying the Winters doctrine, some states 
will recognize an implied federal water right via the Wilderness Act and some 
states will not, resulting in a patchwork of different interpretations of the 
same federal statute across the country.234
This statement, like so many other aspects of Silak’s Potlatch II dissent,
hits the nail squarely on the head. Because it seems unlikely that the US Su-
preme Court will overrule its decision in New Mexico anytime soon235 and it is 
even more unlikely that state appropriators will start looking kindly on water 
rights that have the potential to interfere with their own,236 Congress may be the 
most appropriate body to solve this problem. Repealing the McCarran 
Amendment or amending the organic or enabling acts under which federal 
land reservations are made to require future land designations to be accompa-
nied by express claim of water rights represent viable ways for Congress to 
resolve the problem created by state court abuses of the Winters doctrine. 
A. REPEALING THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT
An outright congressional repeal of the McCarran Amendment, at least as 
applied to federal reserved rights, would return the adjudication of federally 
reserved water rights to its pre-1952 status quo and put federal courts back in 
the driver’s seat.237 Repealing the Amendment would once again grant the fed-
eral government sovereign immunity in this area,238 and would prevent state 
courts of questionable neutrality from deciding the existence and extent of the 
federal government’s reserved water rights.239 This reinstatement of sovereign 
immunity would mean that the agencies charged with managing federal lands 
could litigate these issues exclusively in federal court.  
Although there have not been many federal court decisions on the sub-
stantive parameters of the Winters doctrine with respect to non-Indian reserva-
tions,240 those that have been issued by federal courts have been well-reasoned, 
by comparison to the state courts’ decisions. For example, in Sierra Club v. 
Block, the Colorado federal district court considered whether federally re- 
 234. Id.
 235. The holding in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), was the Supreme 
Court’s last substantive decision on non-Indian implied federal water rights. The Court has not 
since granted certiorari on a substantive reserved water rights issue, despite widespread recogni-
tion that several state court decisions have horribly misapplied the Winters doctrine. See gener-
ally Blumm, supra note 13; Leshy, supra note 68. 
 236. See supra Part III.c. 
 237. See supra Part III.a. 
 238. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 239. See Environmental Law—State Court Adjudication of Federal Reserved Water Rights,
13 J. URB. CONTEMP. L. 239, 240-41 (1977), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/urbanlaw/vol13/iss1/14/. 
 240. See supra Part III.a. 
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served water rights existed for wilderness areas in Colorado.241 In analyzing this 
issue, the court in Block examined both the Wilderness Act itself and the 
Act’s legislative history to determine whether Congress intended to reserve 
water for the federal lands withdrawn as wilderness areas.242 The federal court’s 
conclusion about the purposes of wilderness areas, drawn from its examination 
of those sources, could not have been more different from the Colorado 
court’s analysis of the federal land reserves at issue in Denver or, even more to 
the point, the Idaho Supreme Court’s conclusion regarding wilderness areas in 
Potlatch II.243 The court in Block concluded “the legislative history and the 
provisions of the Wilderness Act make it abundantly clear . . . [that] the pri-
mary motivation of Congress in establishing the wilderness preservation system 
was to ‘guarantee that these lands will be kept in their original untouched natu-
ral state.’”244 This led the federal court to hold Congress did, indeed, intend to 
reserve water for wilderness areas “to the extent necessary” to accomplish this 
purpose:
It is beyond cavil that water is the lifeblood of the wilderness areas. Without 
water, the wilderness would become deserted wastelands. In other words, 
without access to the requisite water, the very purposes for which the Wil-
derness Act was established would be entirely defeated. Clearly, this result 
was not intended by Congress.245
Perhaps as important to the integrity of the Winters doctrine as restoring 
more neutral federal courts to their former preeminence in this area of federal 
law, a repeal of the McCarran Amendment with respect to federal reserved 
rights could undo most of the damage done to the Winters doctrine. The 
greatest impact of such a repeal would likely occur in states like Colorado and 
Idaho, whose high courts have foreclosed important issues associated with the 
doctrine.246 Following repeal, the federal government could avoid this foreclo-
sure by, once again, refusing to have its rights in those states litigated by state 
courts, and by proactively championing its reserved water rights in federal 
courts.247 
 241. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985). 
 242. Id. at 849-63. 
 243. See United States v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982); Potlatch Corp. v. 
United States (In re SRBA) (Potlatch II), 12 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Idaho 2000). These cases are 
assessed supra notes 142-58, 192-206, and accompanying text.
 244. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 850. 
 245. Id. at 862. See also High Country Citizens’ Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235 
(D. Colo. 2006) (holding that the US could not abdicate its responsibility to maintain adequate 
streamflows by relinquishing its water rights to the state). Although federal courts have been 
receptive to federal implied reserved water rights for reserved or withdrawn lands (e.g., national
parks, wildlife refuges, and wilderness areas), they have refused to recognize such rights for non-
reserved public domain lands. Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir 1981).
 246. See supra Part IV. 
 247. However, res judicata would preclude the establishment of federal reserved rights for 
areas that were previously adjudicated in state court so long as the claims involve the same issues 
and parties. See 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 
4468-69 (2d ed. 2012). 
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One might question whether a repeal of the McCarran Amendment with 
respect to federal reserved rights is truly necessary, given that general stream 
adjudications are so few and far between these days. While basin-wide adjudi-
cations are not as prevalent as they once were, those that have occurred have 
established a “superstructure” for water management in the basins in question, 
and they will likely continue to set the playing field in at least portions of the 
West in the foreseeable future.248 Furthermore, as Professor Dan Tarlock ex-
plains, “the experience to date suggests that general adjudications will function 
as one of several management instruments rather than the primary instrument 
as the western states struggle to cope with continued urbanization, the pres-
sures to maintain and restore degraded watersheds, and global climate 
change.”249
Admittedly, repealing the McCarran Amendment would be difficult to 
bring about politically. Opposing forces include the state water appropriators’ 
influence in western states,250 the full-throated support for states’ rights among 
many congressional members, and congressional antipathy toward the envi-
ronment in recent years.251 Moreover, repealing or even amending the McCar-
ran Amendment may not undo the harm already done to the federal lands at 
issue in the state cases discussed above.252
B. EXPRESS RESERVATIONS IN FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS ORGANIC AND 
ENABLING ACTS
Alternatively, Congress could amend the organic acts for the various types 
of federal lands, or the enabling acts under which specific federal land reserva-
tions are made, to include an express claim of federally reserved water rights.253
Amending the various statutes that grant authority for federal reservations of 
land in such a way would prevent future federal withdrawals from being de-
prived of water through result-oriented judicial ingenuity by state courts.254 Oth-
er than a repeal of the McCarran Amendment, such an action likely represents  
 248. Andrea K. Gerlak & John E. Thorson, General Stream Adjudications Today: An In-
troduction, 133 UCOWR J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 2 (2006). This Article should not 
be construed as a call to do away with General Stream Adjudications (“GSAs”) altogether. They 
have fulfilled some important objectives, for example, empowering “Indian tribes to obtain 
congressional water rights settlements that give them much more economic and ecological bene-
fits” than they might otherwise have achieved. Tarlock, supra note 113, at 53. Yet “[c]ontrary to 
the hopes of the proponents of general adjudications, most [GSAs] have not proceeded to the 
entry of a final decree in a reasonable period of time and at a reasonable cost.” Id. at 59.  
 249. Tarlock, supra note 113, at 59. 
 250. See supra Parts III.c., IV. 
 251. See Sandra Zellmer, Treading Water While Congress Ignores the Environment, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (analyzing post-1990 congressional gridlock on envi-
ronmental issues). 
252. See supra note 247 (describing res judicata effect of judgments). 
 253. See Leshy, supra note 68, at 280 (arguing that explicit provisions on federal water rights, 
albeit difficult to craft, are desirable and that “[p]unting to the courts to decide the matter at 
some future time is playing a form of roulette with the outcome, given the historical shifts of the 
Supreme Court on the subject”). 
 254. See supra Part IV. For specific examples, see supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
33794-dvw_16-2 Sheet No. 39 Side B      08/14/2013   08:54:08
33794-dvw_16-2 Sheet No. 39 Side B      08/14/2013   08:54:08
C M
Y K
	ǣͲʹǤ ǣʹǡʹͲͳ͵ͳʹǣʹʹǣͲͲ ǣͺǡʹͲͳ͵ͳͳǣͶ͸ǣͲͲ
292 WATER LAW REVIEW Volume 16
the next most effective way to resolve the problem that state courts have creat-
ed in the federally reserved water rights doctrine. 
In the foreseeable future, however, Congress may be unlikely to adopt 
even the most discrete reforms to federal public lands laws.255 Beyond the gen-
eral environmental gridlock experienced in recent congressional sessions, con-
gressional disputes over federal water rights have stalemated the passage of 
new laws that reserve federal lands for conservation purposes.256 Sidestepping 
the issue altogether and leaving it for the courts to sort out is sometimes the 
only way to move legislation forward. Moreover, amending the existing organic 
acts and existing and future enabling acts would only partially resolve the prob-
lem, as it is unlikely that federal reserved water rights of federal lands set aside 
prior to the passage of such an amendment would benefit. The New Mexico
opinion cast serious doubt on the likelihood of success of any attempt to ret-
roactively assert new statutory purposes for previously reserved federal lands.257
C. MANAGING THE WINTERS RIGHTS OF FEDERAL LANDS ABSENT 
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Given that Congress may be disinclined to take action to strengthen feder-
ally reserved water rights, it is important for federal agencies to be aware that 
they are not entirely without the means of preventing the lands they manage 
from being disseized of Winters rights. A fair understanding of the nature of 
the problem affecting the assertion of federally reserved rights suggests a way 
for federal land management agencies to circumvent it—avoid litigating non-
Indian Winters claims before state courts. Responsible federal agencies can 
achieve this by proactively asserting their federal reserved water rights claims in 
federal courts.  
As discussed above, federal courts have proven themselves to be much 
fairer arbiters of the Winters doctrine than have state courts.258 Consequently, 
should Congress fail to act, federal land management agencies can best protect 
the lands they manage by bringing their federally reserved water rights before 
federal courts. Rather than feeling powerless in the face of state and/or appro-
priator opposition and being reticent with their reserved rights claims while 
state-sanctioned water appropriations threaten the lands appurtenant to those 
rights, agencies should be emboldened to go as far as the evidence will support  
 255. See generally Zellmer, Treading Water, supra note 251. 
 256. See Leshy, supra note 68, at 277-78 (noting that “Silence is a convenient way to paper 
over differences on a difficult or controversial aspect of the proposal under consideration,” but 
also noting that stalemates over reserved water have been broken in some instances by negotiat-
ed provisions that either explicitly reserve water or define alternative ways to protect water re-
sources within the federal lands). 
 257. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 713 (rejecting the argument that the 
passage of MUSYA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31, “confirm[ed] that the Congress always foresaw broad 
purposes for the national forests and authorized . . . as early as 1897 [the reservation of] water 
for recreational, aesthetic, and wildlife-preservation uses”). 
 258. See supra Part V.a. It is also worth noting that Cappaert originated in federal court (in 
contrast to New Mexico, which started as a state GSA). See supra note 50, and accompanying 
text.
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regarding streamflows needed to fulfill reservation purposes. Indeed, at least 
one federal court has recognized that federal land management agencies have 
the duty to protect the federally reserved water rights of the lands they over-
see.259 Absent the initiation of a general stream adjudication in state court—and 
those are few and far between these days260—agencies whose resources are in 
jeopardy should not wait until they are forced to assert their Winters claims 
before a potentially hostile state court. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Recent years have witnessed a significant erosion of the Winters doctrine’s 
ability to protect federal lands and help agencies managing those lands meet 
their management goals.261 As the survey of cases in this Article makes clear, 
this erosion is due, in large part, to state court decisions that deny the existence 
of non-Indian implied federal reserved water rights.262 In the post-McCarran 
Amendment world, where state courts have become the primary arbiters of 
federally reserved water rights, New Mexico’s poor reasoning has allowed hos-
tile state courts to contort the Winters doctrine to the utmost extremes in or-
der to deny implied federal water rights, frustrating the very reasons the doc-
trine was created in the first place and creating an incongruous patchwork of 
decisions.263 . While not all state courts have engaged in the type of result-
oriented abuses evident in the SRBA cases and, to a lesser extent, Denver,264
the problem represented by such cases should not be ignored. Even though 
the Winters doctrine is federal law, the decisions in Denver and the SRBA 
cases have unquestionably impaired the federal government’s ability to assert 
its reserved water rights and thereby protect federal land management goals 
within Colorado and Idaho.265
Despite this ongoing derogation, Congress continues to act in an incon-
sistent or ambiguous manner when passing laws affecting federal reservations.266
This serves to exacerbate the problem and allows state courts to further limit 
the usefulness of a doctrine originally intended to give effect to the intent of 
the often thinly-worded statutes, executive orders, and proclamations that set 
aside federal land.267 
 259. See High Country Citizens’ Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2006) 
(holding that federal agencies may not relinquish Organic Act and Wilderness Act responsibili-
ties for preserving necessary stream flows in the Black Canyon of the Gunnison by delegating 
those responsibilities to state agencies). This opinion is all the more notable because US District 
Judge Clarence Brimmer wrote it. See Ray Ring, Tipping the Scales, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Feb. 16, 2004 (noting that Brimmer “often rules against environmental concerns”). 
 260. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text. 
 261. See generally Blumm, supra note 13. 
 262. See supra Part IV. 
 263. See supra Part IV. 
 264. See supra Part IV. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court gave relatively fair treat-
ment to the federally reserved water rights at issue in In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to 
Use the Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739, 745-49 (Ariz. 1999). 
 265. See supra Part IV. 
 266. See supra Part III.D. 
 267. See supra Part II. 
33794-dvw_16-2 Sheet No. 40 Side B      08/14/2013   08:54:08
33794-dvw_16-2 Sheet No. 40 Side B      08/14/2013   08:54:08
C M
Y K
	ǣͲʹǤ ǣʹǡʹͲͳ͵ͳʹǣʹʹǣͲͲ ǣͺǡʹͲͳ͵ͳͳǣͶ͸ǣͲͲ
294 WATER LAW REVIEW Volume 16
Absent new US Supreme Court guidance, only Congress has the ability to 
prevent the Winters doctrine from further state court abuses, at least at the 
macro level. When, as now, state courts serve as the primary adjudicators of 
federally reserved water rights, this problem will only continue, and possibly 
worsen, unless Congress takes affirmative steps to reduce the complexities that 
have been interjected into the Winters doctrine and return the doctrine to 
some semblance of uniformity.268 This Article discussed two ways Congress 
could accomplish this: repealing the McCarran Amendment or amending the 
organic and/or enabling acts under which federal land is reserved.269 Undoubt-
edly, there are other solutions in the judicial or perhaps administrative realms. 
Indeed, federal agencies likely can and, absent congressional resolution, 
should strive to circumvent potential damage to the Winters rights associated 
with federal lands by proactively asserting those rights in federal courts. That 
said, a problem such as this one, which is “permeated with conflicting philo-
sophical views and economic interests,”270 should not be left unresolved. There 
can be little doubt that our nation’s legislative branch should be more sensitive 
to this threat to the Winters doctrine and, more broadly, to the public’s inter-
est in maintaining the integrity of its public lands. 
 
 268. See supra Part III.C, Part V. 
 269. See supra Part V. 
 270. Potlatch II, 12 P.3d 1260, 1282 (Silak, J., dissenting) (quoting Sierra Club v. Lyng,
661 F. Supp. 1490, 1502 (D. Colo. 1987)). 
